On April 15, 1975, the battle in Phan Rang continued to be fierce. The Xuan Loc-Long Khanh campaign won many victories.

The Politburo and the Central Military Commission telegraphed the Command and Party Committee of the Saigon Front, stating: “The Ho Chi Minh Campaign is very large in terms of purpose, scale, and force… Saigon is the last lair of the US-puppet regime. The leading reactionaries are concentrated here, so it is necessary to anticipate that in certain situations the battle may last for a certain period of time… The enemy can always make new efforts. But we have all the conditions and capabilities to achieve total victory in a short time with a fast pace.”

The battle in Phan Rang continued to be fierce. The 3rd Division continued to send the 2nd Regiment to attack the Kien Kien and Ba Thap strongholds, breaking the inner defensive line (also known as the 2nd line).

At the same time, the 141st Regiment, supported by armored vehicles, crossed Highway 1, crushed enemy resistance nests, and advanced eastward; the 25th Tay Nguyen Regiment, reinforced by Battalion 6 - Regiment 12, developed and approached the north of Thanh Son airport. All of the enemy's important targets in Phan Rang town were tightly surrounded by us.

On the enemy side, at noon on April 15, 1975, Tran Van Don - Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defense of the puppet government and Nguyen Van Toan - Commander of the 3rd Army Corps of the Republic of Vietnam, landed at Thanh Son airport to inspect and encourage the soldiers' morale.

That same evening, Nguyen Vinh Nghi - Deputy Commander of the 3rd Corps of the Republic of Vietnam, Commander of the 3rd Corps Forward, met with other generals in Phan Rang, planning a large-scale counterattack for the next day, in order to retake lost positions and improve the defensive position.

On the same day, Commander of the 2nd Corps Nguyen Huu An and Political Commissar of the Corps Le Linh proposed to the Coastal Wing Command to allow the Corps to send the 325th Division into combat in coordination with the 3rd Division to attack Phan Rang to quickly open the door for the Corps to participate in the attack on the main target of Saigon-Gia Dinh as soon as possible. With the consent of the Eastern Wing Command, the Corps command leaders and commanders at all levels studied the use of a new method of attack on the march to attack Phan Rang.

On the night of April 15, 1975, the entire force of Division 325 (including the 101st Infantry Regiment, the 18th Infantry Regiment with the 5th Tank Battalion and Armored Brigade of the 203rd Brigade attached) deployed to Highway 1 to prepare to break through the Phan Rang defense line in the direction of Highway 1.

In the Xuan Loc-Long Khanh campaign, on the morning of April 15, 1975, we used 130mm artillery to fire at Bien Hoa airport. At the same time, with five mobile raids, the 6th Division and the 95A Regiment destroyed the 52nd Battalion of the Republic of Vietnam at Dau Giay intersection, capturing 12 artillery pieces and all tanks of the 3rd Armored Battalion at the Field Command Post of the 52nd Battalion, which the enemy called "Nguyen Thai Hoc base". We cut off National Highway 1A from Xuan Loc to Bau Ca and completely controlled National Highway 20 from Dau Giay intersection to Tuc Trung.

On the same day, Division 316 and the leading units of the 3rd Corps arrived at the newly liberated Dau Tieng area, occupying a springboard to attack Saigon from the northwest according to the campaign plan.

Meanwhile, at Dong Xoai - the assembly point of the 1st Corps, the Party Committee and the Corps Command met to study, disseminate and discuss leadership measures and organize the implementation of the tasks assigned by the Campaign Command to the Corps in the decisive strategic battle to attack Saigon Gia Dinh.

On April 15, 1975, the Standing Committee of the Regional Party Committee and the Military Region 9 Committee met to assess the situation: On the battlefield, we had a great victory that had an impact on the enemy in the Mekong Delta. However, the enemy's intention to hold Can Tho was clearly revealed.... The capture of Can Tho, in coordination with the force capturing Saigon, could not be carried out, because at this time we had not yet resolved Xuan Loc. With a positive and proactive spirit of attack, the armed forces of the Military Region continued to attack the positions and units of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam, creating favorable conditions for the capture of Can Tho later.

In Military Region 8, on April 15, 1975, Division 8 moved its operations to Route 4, opening the southern corridor of Long An. Regiment 88, Regiment 24 combined with 2 Long An battalions to remove 45 outposts, liberate 12 communes in Chau Thanh, Can Duoc, Tan Tru districts... expanding the attack springboard from the south to Saigon.

For the Truong Son Command, by mid-April 1975, in addition to the 3 regiments spread out on Route 1, 4 companies of the 473rd Division and 1 company of the 509th Regiment were mobilized to carry out missions in the east.

In the west, the 34th and 576th regiments also switched to securing Route 24.

In the south, a part of the 470th Division secured the road in the Dac Ta and Dac Tung areas, then moved down to secure the road in the Chon Thanh area (Route 13), ensuring the crossing of the Be River for our forces in this direction.

The majority of the Truong Son engineering force still operates on both the eastern and western routes, ready to ensure mobility and transportation for our forces in all situations.

NDO