Dien Bien Phu Campaign: On April 27, 1954, our army pursued the enemy all the way to Muong Sai and Luang Prabang. The enemy's Condor operation was completely defeated.

On the enemy side : In April alone, the number of enemy troops eliminated from combat at Dien Bien Phu was 3,071. The paratrooper reinforcements in the month included two battalions and 650 soldiers. However, these reinforcements could not make up for the heavy losses in the past. Regarding weapons, out of 10 tanks, only one was still operational, of 4 155mm cannons, only one could fire, of 24 105mm cannons, only 14 remained. The French expeditionary command in Indochina planned to save itself by deploying the Condor operation to relieve the Dien Bien Phu stronghold on April 27, 1954.

Our troops divided into many groups, penetrating deep to destroy enemy bases in Dien Bien Phu. Photo: Document

On April 27, 1954, British Prime Minister Churchill declared in the British House of Commons: "The British Royal Government is not prepared to make any promises about military action in Indochina until the results of the Geneva Conference are known." The declaration was warmly welcomed by the British House of Commons.

On the same day, French Ambassador Massigli asked to meet Prime Minister Churchill, continuing to plead with Britain to think about the fate of the troops stationed at Dien Bien Phu. Churchill told the French Ambassador: "I have suffered in Singapore, Hong Kong, Tobruk. The British cannot miss the opportunity to resolve their important issues with the communist powers in Geneva because the fate of a French army has been decided."

On our side : On April 27, 1954, upon receiving news that an enemy force from Laos was coming to relieve Dien Bien Phu, the Front Command decided to use the 148th Regiment and the reconnaissance company in Nam Hong Cum to advance towards Muong Khoa to stop the enemy. We ambushed near Muong Khoa located in the southwest of Dien Bien Phu, destroying 4 companies of Lao puppet troops. The enemy fled, and our troops pursued the enemy all the way to Muong Sai and Luang Prabang (Laos). The enemy's Condor operation was a complete failure.

On the same day, the Front Party Committee convened a Conference of Party Secretaries of the corps to criticize the “negative rightist” phenomena. In previous campaigns, each unit fought only a few battles, and the battles usually lasted no more than one night. After each battle, our troops immediately withdrew to a safe position in the rear to rest and consolidate in preparation for the next battle. In this campaign, the fighting had lasted for several months. Long-distance pursuits, sieges, defenses, and fierce counterattacks took place consecutively. Immediately after that, they immediately started building the battlefield, which in itself was also combat. Our troops ate and slept right in the fortifications on the battlefield facing the enemy. The intensity of the fighting had exceeded human endurance.

The Campaign Command under the direct command of General Vo Nguyen Giap is discussing the combat plan for each battle. Photo: VNA

The political agency that went to grasp the ideological situation of the units commented: Through the recent fighting, there emerged examples of brave, intelligent, and creative fighters, but there were also some negative manifestations, such as: fear of sacrifice and hardship, laxity in following orders, and some cadres abandoned their duties in the middle of the battle.

The Party Committee of the Front realized that it could not ignore these new phenomena, so it decided to convene a conference of the secretaries of the major divisions, comrades in charge of the general departments... to review negative rightist ideology before entering the decisive battle.

The commander introduced to the conference the new resolution of the Politburo and presented the report of the Front Party Committee: "Resolutely fight against negative rightist ideology, build a positive revolutionary spirit, and a spirit of thoroughly obeying orders to ensure the complete victory of the campaign."

The conference discussed and agreed on the situation after carefully analyzing the difficulties and advantages of both us and the enemy. Everyone strictly reviewed their shortcomings. The Geneva Conference was about to convene, and everyone saw that they were facing enormous tasks, not only to win the sprint, but also to reach the finish line on time. We were not allowed to neglect our responsibility to win with the least loss of blood and bones.

The next day, most of the political agency cadres divided themselves to help the units carry out a rapid education campaign for the entire army, from the Party Committee to the Party members, from the cadres to the soldiers, so that everyone could clearly understand the situation and raise their determination to complete the mission. A new spirit rose everywhere. This was a great success in political work on the Dien Bien Phu front, one of the great successes of political work in the history of our Army's combat.

THANH VINH/qdnd.vn